Testing expectation theories of decision making without measuring utility or subjective probability by Coombs, Clyde H. et al.
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY: 4, 72-103 (1967) 
Testing Expectation Theories of Decision Making without 
Measuring Utility or Subjective Probability1 
C. H. COOMBS, T. G. BEZEMBINDER,~ AND F. lLJ. GOODE 
The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 
Certain empirical implications of those decision-making theories which involve 
maximizing an expectation are derived. These implications are all measurement-free, 
so neither subjective probability nor utility need be measured. Two experiments are 
reported, the first exploratory and the second intensive and substantial. EV, EU, and 
SEV theory were inadequate to account for the behavior of 12 y0 or more of the subjects 
in either experiment. SEU theory was inadequate in 10% or less of the cases in the 
first experiment and 5 “4 of the cases in the second experiment. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There are four principal theories claiming that, in risky situations in which a given 
set of actions is available, people make decisions by choosing the act that offers the 
highest expectation. These four theories differ in the assumption that utility for money 
is linear or nonlinear with the objective value of money and that subjective probability 
is linear or nonlinear with objective probability. One of these theories, expected value 
or EV theory, is widely known: it defines “expectation” in terms of objective probabil- 
ity and objective value of money. A theory defining “expectation” in terms of linear 
transformations of these components, such as linear subjective probability and linear 
utility for money, would coincide with EV theory. The other three combinations are 
known as (1) expected utility or EU theory, which defines expectation in terms of 
objective probability and nonlinear utility for money; (2) subjectively expected value 
or SEV theory, involving nonlinear subjective probability and linear utility for money; 
and, finally; (3) subjectively expected utility or SEU theory, involving both nonlinear 
subjective probability and nonlinear utility for money (Edwards, 1954). 
The early literature of decision making has been reviewed by Edwards in 1954. 
An extended review of the literature covering the period from 1954 to 1960 has been 
made available by the same author in 1961. Consequently we will only attempt to 
summarize the present status. 
i This research was supported by Public Health Service Research grant MH-04236. 
a Present address: University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands. 
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Quite in contrast to its strength as a normative theory, maximizing expected value 
has never been taken seriously as a descriptive theory of decision-making under risk. 
Ever since Daniel Bernoulli in 1738 introduced the concept of nonlinear utility for 
money (“moral value”, in his terms) in his discussion of the St. Petersburg paradox 
(Bernoulli, 1954; see also Chernoff and Moses, 1959), other theories have predominated. 
The other three theories have been given some substantial amount of experimental 
attention. Some of the principal experimental studies of one or more of these models 
include the following: Coombs and Komorita (1958), Davidson and Marschak (1959), 
Davidson, Suppes, and Siegel (1957), Edwards (1955) Hurst and Siegel (1956), 
and Mosteller and Nogee (1951). In these studies one typically uses an individual’s 
preferential choices among gambles to construct a functional curve for utility and/or 
subjective probability-which of these curves is constructed depends on the model 
under scrutiny-and, assuming the model holds, these curves are used to predict 
his choices among some other gambles. Generally the predictions are substantially 
confirmed and the SEU model appears somewhat superior to any of the others. It 
should be noted, however, that by assuming nonlinearity in both components of the 
gamble the SEU model introduces more degrees of freedom and therefore cannot 
possibly fit the data worse than any of the other models that put more constraints 
on the data. 
Every one of these experiments is subject to severe criticism on one ground or 
another (see Edwards, 1961) and the overall picture is inconclusive. Part of the 
difficulty lies in the tremendous generality of the SEU model. Every subject is a 
separate experiment, as his utility function and subjective probabilities may be 
different from those of others; hence, considerable experimental effort usually has 
to be expended pinning down these values and this may have undesirable consequences, 
e.g., boredom on the part of the subjects. Other potential bases for criticism of such 
experiments include the following: departure from reality in decision making if 
gambles are hypothetical, confounding effects of changes in the status quo if gambles 
are not hypothetical, changes in utility or subjective probability if the experiment 
runs over an extended period, etc. 
One possible way out is, at the end of each experimental session, to select some 
gambles reflecting the subject’s individual preferences and genuinely play them. If 
an adequate interval between experimental sessions is allowed, effects of changes 
in status quo from one session to the next may be neglected. This was done in the second 
of the two experiments reported below. 
The section that follows presents some simple theorems which permit testing these 
several models in a single experiment without measuring utilities and/or subjective 
probabilities. The section concludes with a discussion of the implications of the 
theorems for the experimental design and the analysis of the resulting data matrix. 
The third section presents Experiment I and a detailed discussion of the theory under- 
lying the statistical analysis. The last section presents Experiment II. 
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2. THEOREMS 
Notation: 
pj = an objective probability; 
#i = a subjective probability, a function of pi ; 
u,i = an amount of money; 
uj = the utility of an amount of money zlj ; 
Gj = a gamble with two outcomes: qf > 0) and zero (i.e., no money); the 
gamble Gj offers a probability pj to win zli and a probability 1 -pj to win zero; 
therefore, we will write Gj = (pj , wj). 
The expectation, Ej , for such a gamble under each of the four theories is as follows. 
Expected value theory: 
Ei = p,q ; (1) 
Expected utility theory: 
Ej = p,u, ; (2) 
Subjectively expected value theory: 
Ej = t,bjvj ; (3) 
Subjectively expected utility theory: 
Ej = t,bjuj . (4) 
In this study we will consider pairs of gambles of the form Gj . These pairs have 
the characteristic that one of the gambles of the pair offers a higher probability to 
win a smaller payoff than the other. The former gamble, that is the one with the higher 
probability of winning the smaller amount, will be designated by the subscript I, 
for left, and the latter by the subscript r, for right.3 Hence, we have 
G(p, , vd and G-(P, , vr> where pz > P, and 2)~ -c 0,. . 
In such a pair of gambles we are particularly interested in the ratio of the expecta- 
tions of the gambles. We will study how these ratios change as we add a constant 
positive probability increment, Ap( > 0), to both p, and p, and/or a constant positive 
increment in the objective value of the money payoff, dv(> 0), to both vi and v,. 
The components of the gambles to which increments are to be added (probability 
of winning and/or money value of the payoff) will depend upon the model under 
consideration. 
3 See Fig. 1 for the motivation for labeling. In this figure the left and right gambles that form 
a pair are connected by a dotted line. 
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We will let a prime attached to a quantity always indicate the addition of an in- 
crement to the corresponding unprimed quantity in a pair of gambles. Thus 
~1’ - pc = 0~ = P,.’ ~ pr . 
and 
vr - vr = Av = q’ ~ 91 . 
We define four pairs of gambles, a, b, c, d, as follows (cf. Figure 1): 
n = [GdPl 2 4, G(P, 9 %)I, 
b = [G(P,‘, 4, G&G’, vr)l, 
c = [G(P, , z+‘), G(P~ , v,‘)l, 





FIG. 1. Illustration of four pairs of gambles. 
We shall assume that subjective probability, $, is strictly monotonic with objective 




u , ’ u(v,‘) = U(C,! -I da) :- u, --- u(e,), 
4, = #(Pj') -- 4(Pj T 4Pl .' $1 L $(Pj). 
Ul < ur if and only if zjL < z‘, , 
$1 -/ *I if and only if P1 :-, Pi- . 
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For each pair of gambles we may form the ratio of their expectations as defined 
by any one of Eqs. l-4. Under subjectively expected utility, for example, and the 
pair of gambles a, we may write 
IcId,k = A. (6) 
As another example we may take the ratio C for the pair of gambles c; under expected 
utility theory: 
P1%‘lPr%’ = c. 
In this way we will have for each theory the ratios A, B, C, and D for the corresponding 
pairs of gambles a, b, c, and d. It will not be necessary to have a distinguishing notation 
for these ratios under the different expectation theories as they will never occur in 
conjunction. The theorems to be proven pertain to the relations among these ratios 
for the various pairs of gambles. 
In summary, the gambles considered here are two outcome gambles with one 
outcome zero. Pairs of such gambles are formed in which the left gamble of the pair 
offers a higher probability of winning a smaller amount. We form the ratio of the 
expectations in such a pair of gambles and will next consider how the ratio changes 
if a new pair is formed by adding a constant positive increment to the probabilities 
of winning and/or a constant positive increment to the values to be won. 
THEOREM 1. For the pairs of gambles of the form considered, and with v,vz # 0, 
p, > 0, and Ap > 0, then EV theory requires that A > B; where 
and 
Proof. 
PA = APT~ 9 




A idol. + API > 1 
z - ~4~1 + AP) ’ 
PCAP > P4P. 
A>B. Q.E.D. 
Interpretation: If  we have a pair of gambles oriented as the pair a in Fig. 1, in which 
neither v1 nor v, is zero and p, > 0, then the effect of adding a fixed increment in 
probability, Ap > 0, to both p, and p, is to construct another pair of gambles, b, 
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in which the ratio of the expectation of the left gamble to the expectation of the right 
gamble is smaller than the corresponding ratio in the pair a. 
Consider next the effect of adding a fixed positive increment Av to the amount 
to be won in each gamble of a pair. 
THE :REM 2. For pairs of gambles of the form considered, and with vrvt # 0, pr > 0, 
and Av > 0, then EV theory requires that C > A; where 
pzvz = APT, 3 
and 
PA = CPPT’ 
Proof. I f  we take the ratio C/A, we find that C > A by the same reasoning as 
was followed to prove Theorem 1. 
Interpretation: If  we have a pair of gambles oriented as the pair a in Fig. 1, in which 
neither vr nor v, is zero and p, > 0, then the ef-rect of adding a fixed increment in 
money value, Av > 0, to both vZ and n,, is to construct another pair of gambles, c, 
in which the ratio of the expectation of the left gamble to the expectation of the right 
gamble is greater than the corresponding ratio in the pair a. 
Immediately, from Theorem 1, we have, mutatis mutandis, Theorem 3 for EU 
theory; and from Theorem 2 we have Theorem 4 for SEV theory. 
THEOREM 3. For pairs of gambles of the form considered, and with utu, # 0, 
U(z’ = 0) =- 0, p? >- 0, and Ap >- 0, EU theory requires that A > B; where 
PA = A~ru, 9 
and 
p,‘ul = Bpr’ur . 
THEOREM 4. For gambles of the form considered, with v,vt # 0 and #(p > 0) > 0, 
and Av -> 0, SEV theory requires that C ,> A; where 
4~ = Aiw, , 
and 
I&VI = cyrvUr’ . 
Finally we have Theorem 5 for SEU theory. 
‘I'HEOREM 5. For gambles of the form considered, and if ujz -:- 0) + 0 and 
$(p J-- 0) .> 0, SEL’ theory requires that BC = AD; where 




We will assume that the individuai’s preference on any pair of gambles will indicate 
whether the ratio of the appropriate expectations is greater or less than one. Hence, 
we make the following correspondence to experimental data on the pairwise preferences 
under any one of the theories assuming an individual maximizes the appropriate 
expectation: 
G& , vr) is preferred to G&J, ,o~) o A > 1, 
G&‘, vL) is preferred to G,(p,‘, v,) o B > 1, 
G,(p, , u,‘) is preferred to G,(p, , a,‘) o C > 1, 
(7) 
G&‘, v,‘) is preferred to G&J,‘, z+‘) o D > 1. 
The method of analysis to be discussed in a later section is somewhat complicated 
and it will be useful here to first illustrate the experimental implications of these 
theorems for a small hypothetical data matrix. I f  an individual chooses among the 
gambles of a pair and makes his choice according to any expectation maximization 
theory, then he should prefer the left gamble more strongly to the right one as the 
ratio of the expectation of the left gamble to the expectation of the right one increases. 
In accord with EU theory, he should, for example, prefer the left gamble more strongly 
to the right gamble in the pair a than in the pair b (Theorem 3). He certainly satisfies 
this requirement, if preferring the left gamble to the right one in the pair a, he makes 
the opposite preferential choice in the pair b. Obviously, this also applies to, respectiv- 
ely, the pairs c and d. We will call this behavior a confirmation of EU theory. 
Designating a preferential choice of a left gamble over a right gamble by the symbol 
1 and a choice of a right over a left gamble by the symbol 0, and substituting these 
symbols for the pairs of gambles in Fig. 1, we would have the following little matrix 
of these hypothetical data: 
0 0 
L I 11’ 
The first column in this data matrix represents a data pattern that confirms EU 
theory for the pairs a and b in Fig. 1. Similarly, the second column shows a confirming 
pattern for the pairs c and d. The other possible EU patterns that may appear in a 
TESTING EXPECTATION THEORIES 79 
column, are iii, ;:I and I&. The pattern “1 above a O”, i.e., iii, is a violation of EU 
theory because if an individual chooses the right gamble over the left in the pair a 
(designated by 0) and makes the opposite choice in the pair b, (designated by l), 
then he more strongly prefers the left gamble over the right one in the pair b than 
in the pair a which is the opposite of what is required by EU theory according to 
Theorem 3. 
It is easy to see that the rows of the above little data matrix may be used to test 
SEV theory. Because SEV theory requires C > A (Theorem 4) an individual’s 
preference for the left gamble to the right one should be stronger in the pair c than 
it would in the pair a. The row pattern 10 11 is, therefore, a confirmation of SEV 
theory; the pattern 11 a/ is a violation. 
As the patterns I$, it1 and 10 a/, / I 11 do neither confirm nor violate, respectively, 
EU and SEV theory, they will be called compatible patterns. 
Now by changing both components, i.e., probabilities and payoffs, of the gambles 
in the pair a at once, we have the pair d. The test for SEU theory involves the entire 
2 x 2 matrix (or any second-order minor of a larger data matrix) in accordance 
with Theorem 5. As each of the four cells of this matrix may show a 1 or a 0, there 
are 24 1 16 possible SEU patterns. Which of these patterns are confirming, violating 
or compatible with SEU theory, will be discussed in the section on method of analysis. 
It is not very di,%cult to expand our little basic data matrix. I f  we take a pair of 
gambles such as a in Fig. 1, we can construct a set of pairs of gambles by adding 
successive increments Ap to both p, and p,. , as illustrated in Fig. 2. In this way we 
can generate a column of a data matrix. By adding, in an analogous manner, successive 
increments Av to both v, and z’, of the gambles in the pair a, we may construct a row 
of a data matrix. Constructing in this way an Y x K data matrix, we will have in each 
of its k columns at most (2’) tests for EU theory, and in a column we will get this 
maximum number of tests, as a consequence of Theorems 1 and 3, only if the change 
Ap is the same fixed increment added to p, and p, in a pair of gambles. In each of the 
r rows of the r i: k data matrix we will similarly have at most (i) tests for SEV theory, 
and we will only get all of these if ilv is the same increment added to ZJ~ and u,. in a 
pair of gambles (cf. Theorems 2 and 4). Finally, the Y x k data matrix contains 
(g)(t) second-order minors, and each of these provides us with a test of SEU theory, 
as Theorem 5 does not require dp or Av to be the same constant in, respectively, 
pairs of rows or pairs of columns. It should bc noted, however, that the tests for EU, 
SEV, and SEU theory are in general not independent 
It goes without saying that each cell of our t j k data matrix provides us with 
a statistically independent test for EV theory (Eq. 7j. In constructing our experiment- 
al set of gambles we may make an appropriate choice of pL and p, and of the numerical 
payoffs ~1~ and nj, such that the ratio of the expected value of the left gamble to that 
of the right gamble is greater than unity (A ;‘- I in Theorem 1) for the pair with the 
lowest probabilities: and this ratio can be made to decrease with successive increments 
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0~ to a value less than unity (B < 1 in Theorem 1). As EV theory predicts what 
choice the subject should make in any one pair and therefore what symbol, 1 or 0, 
should appear in any one cell of the data matrix, it predicts where going up in a 
column the symbols should change from 1 to 0. EV theory also predicts where, going 
to the right in a row, the symbols should change from 0 to 1. Because the function 
relating utility to money is unknown, EU theory does not predict the actual position 
of the cutoff point between l’s and O’s in a column of the data matrix. Analogously, 
in the absence of the function relating subjective to objective probability, SEV theory 
will not predict the actual cutoff point between I’s and O’s in a row. 
3. EXPERIMENT I 
A. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The stimuli were gambles of the form discussed in the previous section: they 
offered a probability, pj , to win a finite amount of money vj-otherwise nothing. The 
particular gambles used and their organization into pairs and sets of pairs are perhaps 
most immediately clear from Fig. 2. There are four sets of gambles, each set consisting 
of eight pairs which differ systematically (see Table 1 also). In Set I, for example, 
vl is $0.80 and v, is $1.20; p, - p, = 0.1; and between successive pairs 
Ap =pl’ --p, =p,’ --p, = 0.1. 
The other sets differ from Set I only in vol and v, ; in Set II we have a, = $1.70, 
v,. = $2.30; Set III: v1 = $2.80, v, = $3.20; Set IV: vl = $3.70, v, = $4.30. 
The expected values of the gambles in Sets I-IV are given in Table 1. The arrange- 
ment of the cells in this table is similar to the arrangement of the gambles in Fig. 2. 
So, for example, the gambles comprising the top pair in Set I have the expected values 
given in the top cells of columns 1 and 2, i.e., $0.72 and $0.96. Note that the right 
gamble has the higher expected value. In the bottom pair of gambles in Set I, however, 
we have expected values $0.16 and $0.12 and so, here, the left gamble has the higher 
expected value (see Theorem 1). 
From Table 1 it may also be seen that the increase Av is only a constant going from 
Set I to III and from Set II to IV. In both pairs of sets, Av = $2.00, so only these 
pairs provide us with tests of SEV theory. This is the price paid for having a sensitive 
design for EU theory, which was constructed by putting the EV cutoff point low in 
Sets I and II and high in Sets III and IV. Hopefully, we hit the EU cutoff points of the 
subjects with positively and negatively accelerating utility functions, respectively, 
by the pairs of gambles in the Sets I and II, and in III and IV. 
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I 
0 *so 1.20 1.70 2.30 2.80 3.20 3.70 4.30 
vj (in dolhrs) 
FIG. 2. The four sets of pairs of gambles in Experiment I. 
TABLE 1 
EXPECTED VALUES OF GAMBLES USED IN EXPERIMENT I 
Proh.a 
Amount of Money To Be Won” 
Set I Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 
-- 
0.80 1.20 1.70 2.30 2.80 3.20 3.70 Y.30 
0.9 0.72 1.53 2.52 
0.8 0.64 0.96 1.36 1.84 2.24 
0.7 0.56 0.84 1.19 1.61 1.96 
0.6 0.48 0.72 I .02 1.38 1.68 
0.5 0.40 0.60 0.85 1.15 1.40 
0.4 0.32 0.48 0.68 0.92 1.12 
0.3 0.24 0.36 0.51 0.69 0.84 
0.2 0.16 0.24 0.34 0.46 0.56 
0.1 0.12 -- 0.23 
u Indicates probability of winning. -- 0 In dollars and cents. 
.- __- 
- 3.33 - 
2.56 2.96 3.44 
2.24 2.59 3.01 
1.92 2.22 2.58 
1.60 1.85 2.15 
1.28 1.48 1.72 
0.96 1.11 1.29 
0.64 0.74 0.86 
0.32 - 0.43 
Subjects 
Two distinct groups of subjects were run in Experiment I. Group 1 comprised 
18 mature adults, all Negroes, living in Willow Village, near Ypsilanti, Michigan. 
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There were ten men and eight women, a number of whom were man and wife. They 
were asked by word of mouth if they would care to participate in a study of decision 
making. They were run as a group in one experimental session of 2& hours for which 
they were paid $4.00 each. 
Group 2 comprised 22 University of Michigan undergraduates who had previously 
listed themselves as available as paid subjects for psychological experiments. There 
were nine male students and 13 female students. They were also run as a group in one 
evening session of 24 hours. 
Procedure 
The two groups were run using identically the same procedure except that the 
senior author conducted the session for group 1 and the second author conducted 
the session for group 2. In the experimental session each subject went through six 
booklets. Three of the booklets (1, 3 and 5) contained the 32 pairs of gambles and a 
preferential choice was obtained on each pair. The other three booklets (2, 4 and 6) 
contained the 64 distinct gambles, presented singly, and the instructions were different 
for each booklet. In these three booklets the subject was asked what is the most he 
would pay for a ticket to play the gamble (booklet 2, “buy” data); what is the least 
for which he would sell a ticket to play the gamble (booklet 4, “sell” data); and 
finally, he was asked to set a price on a ticket not knowing whether he would have 
to buy or sell it at that price (booklet 6, “price” data). 
Booklet 1. The instruction page for the first booklet was as shown below. 
I $0.20 
,e l a 
0 \\,,/‘O 0 0 0 OOO 
I 0 
This is a special kind of gamble. It is kind of a wheel of fortune with 10 pegs. 
It has a spinner that goes around and stops on one of the pegs. If it stops on one 
of the 3 black pegs you get $0.20; if it stops on one of the 7 blank pegs you get 
nothing. Now look at this pair of gambles. 
The gamble on the left is a wheel of fortune that has 8 black pegs and 2 blank 
ones. You would win $0.25 if the spinner stopped on any one of the 8 black pegs. 
The wheel of fortune on the right has 4 black pegs and if the spinner stopped on 
any one of those, you would win $0.40. 












l :. l . . C- 
(3 




Now, if you could play only one of these two gambles, which one would you 
choose ? Put your checkmark inside the wheel you choose. 
On the following pages there are several pairs of gambles such as these. There 
will be 2 wheels of fortune and they will always have their winning black pegs at 
the top with the amount that you would win if the spinner stopped on one of the 
black pegs. 
Please, look at each pair on the following pages, and decide which gamble you 
would rather play if you could play only one of them. Put the checkmark inside 
the wheel of the gamble you choose. There are no right or wrong answers; we just 
want to know your choices. 
While you are thinking about one pair of gambles, you should forget any choice 
you made earlier, because all pairs are different. 
Two wheels of fortune were used to illustrate the instructions and all questions 
were freely answered. The rest of the booklet consisted of four pages on each of which 
were eight pairs of gambles, each pair displayed in a box as illustrated in the instruc- 
tions. The 32 pairs of gambles, of course, were those indicated in Fig. 2 and Table 1 I 
The 32 pairs of gambles were in a random order and the pairs were displayed in 
such a way as to balance any response bias for the left or right member of a display. 
Booklet 2. The instruction page for the second booklet was as shown below. 
$0.50 
l ee 
--m-s- 0 o 0 
a,, +,,* 
0 0 0‘ 
0 
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This wheel of fortune has 7 black pegs and it gives you a good chance to win 
$0.50. Now, imagine that you have to have a ticket to play this gamble. The ticket 
gives you one play on this wheel of fortune, and depending upon where the spinner 
stops you get $0.50 or nothing. What is the highest price you would be willing 
to pay for a ticket for this gamble ? Write that price on the dotted line to the left 
of the wheel. 
On the next few pages you will find some more gambles of this kind. Please 
write down on the left of each wheel the highest price you would be willing to pay 
for a ticket for that gamble. 
There are no right or wrong answers and you should only think about one 
gamble at a time. 
To make clear that it was the highest price they would be willing to pay which was 
wanted, an assistant was asked by the experimenter what he would pay for an illustrat- 
ive gamble (one not used in the experimental series), and then questioned whether 
he wouldn’t pay more, until his ceiling was reached. Again, all questions were freely 
answered before proceeding with the experimental series. 
The rest of the booklet consisted of eight pages on each of which were eight of the 
64 distinct gambles. The sequence of 64 was arranged to balance the four sets of 
gambles. 
Booklet 3. The instruction page for Booklet 3 was the same as that for Booklet 
1 and the instructions were briefly reviewed. The four pages which followed contained 
the 32 pairs and were the same pages as those for Booklet 1 but permuted in the order 
2,3,4, 1. 
Booklet 4. The instruction page for Booklet 4 was as shown below. 
Suppose you have a ticket to play this gamble. The ticket gives you only one 
play on this wheel of fortune. So, if you sell your ticket to someone else, you cannot 
play this gamble any more. What is the smallest amount for which you would be 
willing to sell your ticket to someone else ? Write that amount on the dotted line 
to the left of the wheel. 
Please do the same thingwith the gambles on the following pages. Again, there are 
no right or wrong answers and you should only think about one gamble at a time. 
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Again an assistant was used to make clear that they were asked to give the lowest 
price at which they would sell a ticket to play the gamble. 
The following eight pages were the same as those of Booklet 2 but permuted in 
the order 5, 6, 7, 8, 1, 2, 3, 4. 
Booklet 5. The instruction page was the same as that for Booklet 1 and again 
the instructions were briefly reviewed. The four pages which followed were the same 
as those for Booklet 1 but permuted in the order 3,4, 1,2. 
Booklet 6. The instruction page for Booklet 6 was as shown below. 
Suppose you have a ticket to play this gamble and your neighbor also has a ticket 
for it. Now, would you please put down one single amount that may be used either 
for buying your neighbor’s ticket or selling your own. When you put down this 
amount, you don’t know whether it is going to be used for buying or selling. Just 
pretend that we will decide whether the amount you have written down will be 
your buying price or your selling price. If we decide the amount is a buying price, 
then you would need to pay your neighbor that price for his ticket. But if we decide 
that your amount is a selling price, then you would have to sell your ticket for that 
price. Please write down, now, that amount on the dotted line on the left of the 
wheel. 
On the following pages you will find some other gambles. For each gamble you 
should figure out a single price that may be used either for buying your neighbor’s 
ticket or selling your own. For each gamble you should write down that amount 
without knowing which way it will be used. 
The eight pages which followed contained the experimental series and were the same 
a~ those of Booklet 2 but permuted in the order 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1. 
B. METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
Pair-Comparison Data 
On each pair of gambles three replications of the subject’s preferential choice 
were obtained. For each subject these three choices were summarized in an 8 x 4 
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cumulative data matrix showing in each of its 32 cells-which represented the 32 pairs 
of gambles as displayed in Fig. 2-the number of times in %he three replications that 
he preferred the left gamble over the right one, that is an integer from the set (0, I, 2, 3). 
By mapping frequencies of 0 and 1 into a 0 and frequencies of 2 and 3 into a 1 the 
cumulative matrix could be readily converted into a reduced (0, 1) matrix of the sub- 
ject’s stochastically dominant choices. 
If  a theory holds in an absolute and deterministic manner, then replications are 
unnecessary, and only the integers 0 and 3 would appear in the cumulative matrix. 
This was manifestly not the case, and the question arises whether a theory can be 
said to hold in a stochastic sense, in the sense of failing to hold only due to random 
fluctuations in judgment. 
Because of the mutual dependencies between the different data patterns, it was 
not clear how the reduced matrix-or any data matrix-could be used to assess that 
question. Before going into details we may, therefore, first give, in the paragraph 
below, a rather general idea of the tests we devised for any particular subject using 
his cumulative and reduced matrices. As the entire following presentation refers to 
the ith subject we will omit the subscript i on the parameters to be used. 
Corresponding to a manifest choice of the subject, we assume there exists a latent 
choice, which he would manifest in case there were no random Ructuations in judg- 
ment. Due to fluctuations of this kind, however, his manifest and latent choices may 
sometimes be diKerent, and thus he may not be completely consistent over replications 
in his choices on a given pair of gambles. Since he makes binary choices, for a given 
pair of gambles at least one-half of his choices will be the same over replications, 
regardless of how much the choices agree with his latent preference. Thus for a given 
pair of gambles his consistency over replications must be between 0.5 and 1.0. 
We will obtain, within this range, two independent estimates of the subject’s 
consistency. The first estimate, $, will be independent of any expectation theory. 
The other estimate, p”, will depend upon the particular expectation theory to be 
tested and may, therefore, assume different values for different expectation theories. 
If  p” < $, the expectation theory apparently does not put enough constraint on the 
data but rather requires a “fudge” factor of inconsistency on the subject’s part that 
exceeds his level of inconsistency estimated independently of any expectation theory. 
So, if for a particular subject p” < $, the expectation theory taken into account by p” 
is clearly to be rejected. 
In order to estimate ~5 we first define v  as the probability that on a given pair of 
gambles the subject’s choice in any particular replication is the same as his true 
preference. This probability n is independent from any expectation theory and 
expressing the probability of a manifest choice to refect the underlying true choice 
it may be regarded as a consistency index for any particular replication. 
The n for an individual may be readily estimated from the following considerations. 
The cumulative data matrix of an individual has a 3 or a 0 in a cell if and only if the 
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individual makes the same choice on all three replications. The probability that he 
makes his true latent choice three times is v  3; the probability for him to make the 
opposite choice in all three replications is (1 - x)~. If  we let h be the proportion of the 
entries that are 3 or 0 in his cumulative matrix, we may write the following equation: 
d + (1 - 7T)3 = h. 
Similarly, the cumulative matrix shows an entry of 1 or 2 whenever the individual 
makes a particular choice in any one and the opposite choice in the two remaining 
replications. In either case his single odd choice can, of course, occur on any one of the 
three replications. As 1 - X is the proportion of l’s and 2’s we have the equation: 
3n2(1 - Tr) + 3741 - Tr)” = 1 - x. 
This equation may be reduced to Eq. 8 and has the same solution: 
7.f = 1 & Q([3(4X - l)]““}. (9) 
The consistency estimated by rr must lie in the interval 0.50-1.00, where the lower 
bound represents consistency at the level of tossing a fair coin. We don’t demand 
that these theories predict random behavior, but some significant level of consistency 
is required to make a fair test. For this reason, v  values above 0.68 (beyond 2~) will 
be taken to represent significant levels of consistency.4 
The probability r may be used to compute the probability $, that an entry (of 1 
or 0) appearing in the reduced matrix reflects the subject’s latent preference. Because 
the cumulative frequencies of 0 and 1 were mapped into a 0 and those of 2 and 3 
into a 1 in his reduced matrix, the probability fi that the individual’s “true” latent 
preference will appear in the reduced matrix is the probability that he chose according 
to his latent preference at least twice. It is, in other words, the probability that he 
made his latent choice on all three or that he made it only on two replications in any 
of the (i) =-- 3 ways. Hence, we may write: 
The solution to this equation for each individual provides an estimate of his level 
of consistency based on replicating pairwise choices with no reference to any expecta- 
tion theorv. 
Sow if a person’s latent preferences exactly satisfied a particular theory there would 
still bc some inconsistency in his manifest choices. If  the degree of consistency cal- 
cuiated under a particular theory, 3, is much smaller than that indexed by 6 (which 
assumes that there is a constant probability of correspondence between choice and 
preference), it indicates that his behavior fits the theory rather poorly. If, on the other 
hand, his inconsistency is not increased by the effort to constrain his data to fit the 
4 I.e., 77 ‘2 0.50 20. where o4 = pq:n, p = q = :, n = 32. 
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theory, then so far as we can judge in the light of his manifest preference-inconsistency, 
his data fit the theory as well as they fit the theory that there is a true constant value 
of which $ is the estimate. 
The manner5 in which p” may be estimated under a particular theory will be described 
in detail for EU theory; appropriate modifications for SEV and SEU theory will then 
be pointed out. 
Under EU theory, as a consequence of Theorem 3, the only admissible latent 
patterns are the two compatible patterns I$ and I:/ and the confirming pattern #. 
In the manifest data, because of the stochastic properties of choice, the violating 
pattern I$ may be expected to occur as well. As p” gives the probability that a manifest 
choice will reflect a latent preference under EU theory, we may write down, as in 
Table 2, the probability of each pattern occurring in the manifest data conditional 
on which latent pattern obtains, (where 4 = 1 -8). 
TABLE 2 
PROBABILITY OF THE COLUMN PATTERN BEING MANIFFST 
IF THE Row PATTERN IS LATENT 
Let 0 be the proportion of latent compatible patterns for the individual and hence 
1 - 0 the proportion of latent confirming patterns. The probability A of obtaining 
a compatible pattern, $1 or /iI, in the individual’s reduced matrix is 
A = (jP + p>e + 2pg( I - e>. (10) 
The probability B of a confirming pattern I$ being manifest is: 
B =ge +p(i - e). (11) 
And clearly, the probability of a violation I$ being manifest is 1 - A - B. 
6 We are indebted to Lincoln Moses for this suggestion. : 
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If we let P, s, and t represent the number of compatible, confirming, and violating 
patterns manifest in a particular individual’s reduced matrix, then the method of 
moments yields estimates of p” and 6 by equating 
A to r/N and B to s/N, 
where N = r + s t t = 4(i) = 112, that is the total number of EU patterns in the 
8 x 4 reduced matrix showing (i) patterns in each of its four columns. To be more 
specific, the method of moments estimates p” and 0 by equating A to the proportion 
of compatible and B to that of confirming manifest patterns, substituting the obtained 
values for A and B in the Eqs. 10 and 11, and solving these forfi and 6’ simultaneous- 
ly. These calculations are tedious and were done on an electronic computer. It may 
be remarked that exactly the same estimates would result from writing down the 
“likelihood’‘-as if all patterns were statistically independent, which they cannot 
be-and applying the method of maximum likelihood, in which case we would have 
I@, 0) = A’B”(1 - A - B)t. (12) 
Identically, the same procedure can be carried out for SEV theory except, of course, 
that the values of T, s, and t are different, being based on row patterns rather than 
column patterns. Here, Y + s + t = (2) (8) = 16, as there are only two patterns 
in each of the eight rows. 
The procedure for estimating p” and 0 under SEU theory is essentially the same 
but slightly more complex. The patterns involved in testing SEU theory are the patterns 
in the second-order minors of the reduced data matrix. Every second-order minor 
indicates the order relation on the expectations of each of the four pairs of gambles, 
designated in the notation of Theorem 5 as j f :  ;I Theorem 5 says that if the entries . 
in the minor were numerical ratios of expectations, rather than just order relations, 
the determinant of every second-order minor would equal zero, i.e., AD = BC. 
The total number of possible patterns of second-order minors in the stochastic 
dominance matrix is 24 = 16. If  SEU theory holds, 14 of these 16 are admissible 
as true latent patterns, two are inadmissible or violating. The violating patterns are 
ii ;I and 1: ,$. Clearly, Th eorem 5 is violated if A and D are both greater than 1 (or 
less than 1) and B and C are both less than 1 (or greater than 1). The remaining 
patterns may be collapsed into two classes, as in the case of EU and SEV theory, 
and again called compatible and confirming. 
The motivation for using these terms for the classes is as follows: A pattern is 
classified as compatibZe if, given any three elements of the pattern, there is no constraint 
on the fourth element. The remaining patterns are classified as conjirming or violating 
because, given one particular subset of three elements of the pattern, the fourth element 
is predicted by SEU theory and hence is either confirmed or violated. For example, 
consider the incomplete pattern !l y;, i.e., B > 1, C ; 1, D ;- 1 (see Eq. 7). For the 
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determinant of this minor to equal zero, A must be greater than I. Hence, the occur- 
rence of a one is confirming, the occurrence of a zero is a violation. 
The patterns are enumerated according to class in Table 3. 
TABLE 3 
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The equations for SEU theory that correspond to Eqs. 10 and 11 for EU and 
SEV theory are as follows: 
A = ($4 + 4p”‘qz + tf”)O + 3@3p” + $‘3)(1 - e), (13) 
B = 4(fY3q” + @q3)B + (fi” + 6p”“q”” + ij4)( 1 - 0). (14) 
These equations were obtained by writing out a 14 x 16 matrix like Table 2 for the 
manifest and latent SEU patterns and following the same procedure as was used to 
get Eqs. (10) and (11). 
The expression for the likelihood of the data under SEU theory is exactly 
the same as Eq. (12) with the appropriate substitutions of A and B and where 
r + s + t = (i) (t) = 168, the total number of second-order minors. 
It is important to note that for SEV theory the 16 tests contained in each matrix 
are experimentally independent whereas the 112 tests of EU theory and the 168 tests 
of SEU theory are not. The test of EU theory, however, is at least as powerful as the 
test of SEV theory, and the test of SEU theory is at least as powerful as that of EU 
theory. 
For EV theory, the test is simpler. In the 8 x 4 reduced matrix there are 30 pre- 
dictions of either a 1 or 0, as two of the cells represent judgments on pairs of gambles 
which have equal expected values (see Table 1). Th e expectation and variance of the 
number of times these predictions will fail, given $, is 
E(V) = 30(1 -$), (15) 
Var (V) = 30$( 1 - $) . (16) 
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Bidding Data 
Only a single response (judgment) was obtained from each subject for each of the 
bidding conditions: buy, sell, and price; and so there was no control of inconsistency. 
Also, subjects tended to respond in multiples of 5 cents and 10 cents. Our intent had 
been to convert the bids of each kind into a (1,0) data matrix of pair comparisons 
implied by the bids, realizing that an intermediate category of judgment was added- 
“indifference”. Adding this t m ermediate category of response, of course, multiplies 
the variety of response patterns under each model. This fact, in conjunction with the 
lack of control on inconsistency, discouraged us from devising a test of the theories 
using the bidding data. Instead, the data were pooled for various subgroups and analyz- 
ed for trends which might be useful for guidance in future experiments using this 
method of data collection. 
C. RESULTS 
There was one subject who did not complete his tasks during the experimental 
session (Subject 111, WVM). As his data were not analyzed, the following discussion 
deals with the 39 remaining subjects. 
Inconsistency of Judgment 
A value of r was obtained for each subject as a solution to Eq. 9. There were three 
subjects who failed to show significant levels of consistency. It is an interesting ob- 
servation that all three of these subjects had values of X < i-they had fewer O’s 
and 3’s than are to be expected by tossing a fair coin-they were more inconsistent 
than pure chance. This could be an unusual statistical event with the subjects’ having 
no true preference or, what is perhaps more reasonable, these subjects changed their 
basis of preference in the course of the experiment. In any event, no parameter estimates 
could be made for these three subjects. 
The distribution of x values for the remaining subjects is given in Table 4. 
An arcsine transformation was applied on these TT values and a two-way analysis 
of variance made to compare College Students with Willow \?llage subjects and Males 
and Females. The rest&s are reported in Table 5, The significant interaction reffccts 
the fact that college student males tended to he highlv consistent and \villom- 
\‘illagr males much less so. whereas, there is little difference bctw-een the two 
groups of women. 
Tests qf Expectation Models 
The specific results for each subject under each theory are presented in Table 6. 
The four theories form a partial order, with SEli the most general case, EL: and 
SE\- special cases but distinct, and E\- theory a special case of each of them. If a 
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TABLE 4 
DISTRIBUTION OF 7~ VALUES, EXPERIMENT I. 






























































ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCY 
Source df MS F 
CS vs WV (A) 
SEX (B) 
A x B 
Error 
“Significant at 0.01 level. 
1 192.09 2.984 
1 14.69 - 
1 726.99 11.294” 
32 64.37 
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TABLE 6 















Exp.# Obs.# Signif. 

























1.ooo 0.0 15 
0.997 0.1 15 
0.991 0.3 8 
0.866 4.0 11 
0.994 0.2 8 
0.942 1.7 13 
0.969 0.9 8 
- - 
203 0.991 0.3 8 
204 1.000 0.0 0 
206 1.000 0.0 8 
207 0.997 0.1 11 
210 l.ooO 0.0 15 
213 0.982 0.5 15 
219 1.ooo 0.0 8 
220 1.000 0.0 15 
222 0.942 1.7 15 
201 0.976 0.7 8 
202 0.969 0.9 4 
205 0.819 5.4 12 
208 0.982 0.5 7 
209 0.930 2.1 13 
211 0.952 1.4 8 
212 0.976 0.7 11 
214 0.969 0.9 7 
21s 0.902 2.9 8 
216 0.994 0.2 12 
217 0.999 0.1 15 
218 0.987 0.4 8 
221 0.885 3.4 9 











































~ ~~ .-- 
0, p”i 6 
- - 
0.50 0.94 0.46 
- 
0.69 0.94 0.58 
0.88 0.999 0.76 
0.91 0.86 0.49 
- - - 
0.99 0.74 0.96 
- - - 
- - - 
0.95 0.999 0.88 
- 0.999 0.83 
0.85 0.90 0.74 
- - - 
- 0.999 0.83 






























































0.99 0.999 0.83 




0.19 0.999 0.88 
- 
0.75 0.999 0.67 
0.93 0.90 0.93 
0.95 0.94 0.89 
0.82 0.94 0.64 
0.82 0.999 0.73 
- - 
0.91 0.98 0.55 
0.93 0.96 0.76 
0.95 0.999 0.88 
0.99 0.999 0.76 
0.88 0.999 0.83 
u A dash (I-” indicates no parameter estimates could be made in that instance, e.g. 6, is 
imaginary, or the data matrix consists of all l’s or O’s and hence no information in it. etc. 
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particular theory is found not to hold for a subject, then it follows that any special 
cases of it would not hold either. To reject SEU theory for some subject, for example, 
is to reject all the other theories for that subject.6 
SEU theory could be tested on 23 of the subjects and rejected for subjects 115 and 
208. 
SEV theory could be tested on 21 of the subjects and rejected for the following 
seven subjects: 102, 105, 115, 203, 208, 214, 218. This theory is rejected for 115 and 
208 because SEU theory is rejected for them. 
EU theory could be tested on 29 of the subjects and rejected for the following 
seven subjects: 102, 115, 206, 208, 209, 214, 218. This theory is rejected for 115 and 
208 because SEU theory is rejected for them. 
It comes as no surprise that EV theory may be rejected for 34 of 37 subjects on 
whom it could be tested. Only for Subjects 110, 113, and 204 could it not be rejected. 
Bidding Data 
For each of the subgroups listed in Table 7, the average bid for each of the 64 
gambles was computed under each of the bidding instructions. Slope (m), intercept 
(k) and correlation (r) between average bid and EV are reported in the table. 
TABLE 7 
SLOPE (n), INTERCEPT (k), AND CORRELATION (r), BETWEEN AVERAGE BID 
AND EXPECTED VALUE 
Group 
buying bids selling bids price bids 
m k Y m k I m k Y 
Willow Village Men 0.22 0.04 0.76 0.51 0.12 0.96 0.49 0.09 0.98 
Willow Village Women 0.20 0.07 0.94 0.60 0.39 0.88 0.49 0.40 0.88 
All Willow Village 0.22 0.05 0.88 0.56 0.25 0.95 0.49 0.23 0.96 
College Student Men 0.72 0.01 0.98 0.88 0.88 0.99 0.87 0.04 1.00 
College Student Women 0.31 0.04 0.96 0.77 0.77 0.99 0.68 0.05 0.99 
All College Students 0.48 0.02 0.98 0.81 0.81 0.99 0.76 0.05 0.99 
All Subjects 0.36 0.04 0.97 0.70 0.70 0.99 0.64 0.13 0.99 
6 Differences in the third decimal place (e.g., S’ubject 105 for SEU theory) were not counted 
against a theory nor were differences due to rounding off error (e.g., Subjects 204 and 219 for 
whom iI < 1.000 if the fourth decimal place had been reported). 
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Figures 3 and 4 portray the relations for the buying and selling data separately 
for the Willow Village subjects and the College students. The plots for the price bids 
yields regression lines intermediate between those for buy and sell bids but rather 
closer to that for selling bids. This holds for each group of subjects, In general, our 
subjects bid more than the expected value for gambles with low expectations and 
underbid gambles whose expected values were higher, but the overall tendency was 
clearly to underbid. 
4. EXPERIMENT II 
Experiment I was essentially a preliminary trial of the general experimental design 
and the method of analysis. Experiment II is a much more substantial study in terms 
of the number of stimuli, the number of subjects, the realism of the experimental 
situation, and the involvement of the subjects. The collection and analysis of these 
data were under the supervision of the third author. 
FIG. 3. Relation of bids to expected value for all \Yillow Village subjects. 
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A. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Stimuli 
Figure 5 displays the 47 distinct gambles used in Experiment II, and their 
organization into six sets with six pairs of gambles in each set. This design permits the 
probabilities to have about the same range as in Experiment I and yields a 6 x 6 data 
matrix; hence the same number of tests can be made of SEV theory as of EU theory, 
whereas in Experiment I the data matrix was 8 x 4. The gambles are of the form used 
in Experiment I and, of course, the theorems pertain to them: some finite probability 
of a finite prize, otherwise nothing. In this experiment real gambles were used, and 
each prize was some number of cigarettes.’ 
The expected value of each gamble is contained in Table 8. The configuration of 
cells in Table 8 corresponds to the configuration of gambles as portrayed in Fig. 5. 
So, for example, the top pair of gambles in Set I, [(7/8, 5), (6/8, lo)] as shown in 
Fig. 5 may be seen to have expected values [(4.38), (7.50)]. 
FIG. 4. Relation of bids to expected value for all college students. 
’ Pall Mall were the particular cigarettes used. Glassine stamp envelopes were used to package 
lots of five cigarettes. These were used as payoffs, alone, or as supplements to a normal package 
of 20 as required. 
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FIG. 5. The six sets of pairs of gambles in Experiment II. 
TABLE 8 
EXPECTBD VALUES OF GAMBLES USED IN EXPERIMENT II 
Number of Cigarettes to be b-on 
Pr0b.” 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 
7.8 4.38 8.75 13.12 17.50 21.88 26.25 
68 3.75 7.50 11.25 15.00 IS.75 22.50 26.25 
5,8 3.12 6.25 9.38 12.50 15.62 18.75 21.88 
4;8 2.50 5.00 7.50 11.00 12.50 15.00 17.50 
3’8 1.88 3.75 5.63 7.50 9.38 I I .25 13.12 
28 1.25 2.50 3.75 6.00 6.25 7.50 8.75 
18 - 1.25 1.88 2.50 3.12 3.75 4.38 
Each gamble K-IS set up on a wheel of fortune and photographed with the spinner 
:-~movcd.‘l’henh~rl of fortune had eight circles around the rim(instcad of IO as portrav- 
~td in the booklets used in Espcriment I). From I to 7 of the circles was colored black 
to indicate the probability of positive outcome, and these black circles were oriented 
symmetrically about the top of the wheel of fortune. These photographs were then 
used to construct slides of the pair comparisons. Hence these stimuli will be called 
the “slide”stimuli to distinguish them from the “booklet stimuli” used in Experiment I. 
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Subjects 
The subjects were inmates of the State Prison of Southern Michigan, Jackson, 
Michigan, a very large, maximum security prison. Initially, 120 men were selected 
from volunteers responding to an article in the prison newspaper. Those who were 
due for parole or had IQ’s below 90 were rejected, as well as those for some other 
sufficient and prohibitive cause. 
Procedure 
The 120 subjects were divided into six convenient groups of 20 each for an ex- 
perimental session. An experimental session was scheduled for 2 hours. Each group 
of men undertook five experimental sessions at l-week intervals followed by additional 
sessions in which related data were collected-some of which are reported here. The 
experimenters visited the prison on the same two successive days each week, running 
three groups of men each day. 
A group of subjects went through a single replication of the 36 pair comparisons 
in each experimental session. Each pair of gambles was projected on a screen and each 
subject marked his preference on a data sheet. The 36 pairs were randomized in two 
different orders, each used in alternate sessions one week apart. The gamble technically 
defined as the left gamble in Fig. 1 appeared on the left in one order and on the right 
in the other order. 
The experimental slides were alternated with color slides of scenery, etc., which 
were left on for i to 3 minutes, depending on how much the men liked it and wanted 
to discuss it. At the beginning of the first experimental session the experimental 
slides were exposed for 1 minute per slide and by the fifth session the exposure dura- 
tion had been reduced to 15 seconds. In the latter sessions, the time available (about 
Q hours) was used to collect additional data. 
The subjects were informed that on each day at the end of the 36 experimental 
slides, one would be chosen to be played for real, and that each subject would play 
the particular gamble he had preferred in that pair. Then at the end of the 36 pairs, 
the data sheets were collected, the subjects filed up, and the pair selected was projected 
on the screen. Two wheels of fortune were set up on a table beneath the screen corres- 
ponding to the two gambles portrayed; and as each subject filed up to the table, his 
choice was called out by an assistant who read it from the subject’s data sheet. The 
subject then spun the wheel of fortune that he had chosen and was immediately paid 
off in cigarettes if he won, otherwise nothing. 
The pair of gambles chosen to be played was selected to be nearly equal in EV so 
that there would be less likelihood of a consensus of choice influencing an individual’s 
later choices. A different pair was chosen for each group of subjects run on the same 
day. 
Over the five sessions a subject’s expected total winning was approximately 60 
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cigarettes. In addition each subject was paid $0.50 per experimental session if he 
completed all five sessions, otherwise $0.25 per session for those he completed. Out 
of the initial 120 subjects, 108 completed the first five sessions. 
Further experimental sessions were run, again at l-week intervals, in which addi- 
tional data were collected on those subjects who volunteered to continue. Some of 
the additional data collected were on Booklets 1, 3, and 5 used in Expt. I. Booklet 
1 was administered in Session 6 and Booklets 3 and 5 were administered at the be- 
ginning and the end of a later session with intervening tasks lasting about an hour. 
The procedure followed was otherwise the same. Seventy-eight subjects finished 
these booklets. 
B. METHOD AND ANALYSIS 
The method of analysis for the pair comparisons data on the new stimuli was 
essentially the same as that for Booklets 1, 3, and 5 in Experiment I, except for some 
alterations to adapt to five replications and to six sets of stimuli. 
In Experiment I analysis, we estimated v  on the basis of the number of perfectly con- 
sistent responses (O’s and 3’s) in the cumulative total matrix. A similar approach could 
have been used in Experiment II (computing r from the number of O’s and 5’s in the 
cumulative total matrix over five replications); but it would have required the solution 
of Sth-degree equations, so another approach was used which appeared to be simpler 
for our purposes. The computer formed all subsets of three replications and computed 
a h and n on each, using the same formulas as for Experiment I (Eqs. 8 and 9). Each r 
computed from a subset of three replications is an unbiased estimate of the individual’s 
latent consistency. Therefore if the V’S from the subsets are averaged, the resulting 
average 7~ will likewise be an unbiased estimate. This average z has the same inter- 
pretation mentioned previously, namely the probability that a subject’s manifest 
choice on any particular occasion is identical to his latent preference, without assuming 
anything about any expectation theories. 
This x may be used as before to compute an index of consistency fi for the individual’s 
reduced matrix. The index $ is the probability that a stochastically dominant choice 
of 0 or 1 (reduced from five replications) is the same as the subject’s latent preference. 
They will be the same only if he makes his latent choice on more than half of the five 
replications. The formula for $ is therefore based on the number of ways that this 
can happen: 
1; =: 4 + .5T4(l -- 7T) 4 10x3(1 - ?7)s. 
There is no essential change in the method for estimating the 4 indices of consistency 
based upon the EL?, SEV, and SEU expectation theories, since neither the dimensions 
of the matrix nor the number of replications entered into the derivation of the $ 
formulae (Eqs. 10-14). The only change was in the number of predictions for 
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each theory as follows: N = 90 for EU and SEV theory, and N = 225 .for SEIJ 
theory. 
The method of analysis for EV theory was unchanged from Experiment I. For a sub- 
ject who maximizes expected value, predictions can be made of his paired comparison 
choices by referring to Table 8. The two gambles from any pair formed along the 
diagonal from the lower left to the upper right have equal expected value, so no 
predictions can be made for those six pairs. EV predictions can be made for the 
remaining 30 pairs, however, with 0 predicted for all pairs above the diagonal and 1 
for’all pairs below the’diagonal. 
C. RESULTS 
We will summarize the results with primary attention to the results on the slide 
stimuli, since this part of Experiment II was highly realistic and the subjects were 
much involved. 
Inconsistency of judgment 
:-d,The distrib u ion of rr values is given in Table 9. There were two subjects (058 and t’ 
082) & of the lc8 whose level of inconsistency was within 20 of chance. Interestingly 
enough, when they later responded to the booklet stimuli they were quite consistent. 
Conversely, two subjects who were consistent on the slide stimuli (014 and 033) were 
the most inconsistent on the booklet stimuli. 
No statistical comparison of these distributions has been made with the college 
student or Willow Village population because of the difference in the stimuli in the 
case of slides against booklets and because of the difference in procedure in the case 
of the booklet stimuli. In the latter case the second and third replications were a 
week after the first in Experiment II and the subjects were highly experienced after 
five previous sessions on the slide stimuli. 
XesLof Expectation Models 
We present in Table 10 a summary of the results on testing the expectation models 
with the slide stimuli of Experiment II. Of the 87 subjects for whom EV theory was 
rejected, 72 deviated at the 0.001 level, and seven at the 0.01 level. EV theory was 
rejected for eight other subjects because they violated one or more of the other 
theories of which EV theory is a special case. 
For the other three theories, the results were as follows. SEU theory could be 
tested on 85 subjects and rejected* for four of them (5 %). 
* A theory was rejected only if J? - 6 > 0.010, to be consistent in dealing with rounding the 
effects. 
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TABLE 9 
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TABLE 10 
RESULTS ON TESTING THE EXPECTATION MODELS WITH THE 
SLIDE STIMULI OF EXPERIMENT II 
No. of Subjects EV EU SEV SEU 
Theory Tested 108 92 85 85 
Theory Rejected 87 23 29 4 
SEV theory could be tested on 85 subjects and rejected for 29 of them (34%). 
This theory is rejected for two of the 29 because SEU theory is rejected for them. 
EU theory could be tested on 92 subjects and rejected for 23 of them (25 %). This 
theory is rejected for one of the 23 because SEU theory is rejected for him. 
The results on testing the expectation models with the booklet stimuli are summariz- 
ed in Table 11 which includes the results from Experiment I for comparison. It is 
TABLE 11 
RESULTS ON TESTING THE EXPECTATION 









EV EU SEV SEU 
78 66 43 52 
67 15 8 5 
37 29 21 23 
34 7 7 2 
evident that the results on the booklet stimuli are quite similar in the two experiments 
and they differ little from the results on the slide stimuli, and mostly in testing SEU 
theory. For the booklet stimuli and under the hypothetical gambling conditions 
used, SEU theory could be rejected for about 10% of the subjects in both Experi- 
ments I and II and with more realism and high involvement, SEU theory was still 
rejected for 5 o/o of the subjects. 
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